


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# Soviet Union-Eastern Europe

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## SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Moscow Waffles on Portuguese Timor

International attention to the Indonesian invasion of Portuguese Timor and Soviet ideological pretensions have led Moscow to edge closer to public criticism of Jakarta. The Soviets are still pulling their punches, however, for fear of upsetting their gradually improving relations with Indonesia.

The most authoritative statement thus far of Moscow's views on the invasion appeared in a *Pravda* commentary by A. Yuryev on December 12. Yuryev implies that the Soviet Union's sympathies rest with the leftist-oriented Fretilin faction, but he stops short of directly condemning the Indonesian government's action. The commentator simply attributes the military invasion to a "pro-Indonesian" group. Yuryev speaks of Moscow's support of Timor's right to self determination, but refrains from making any judgment as to whether the former colony should remain independent or be absorbed by Indonesia.

The invasion came at an unfortunate juncture for Moscow because Soviet-Indonesian relations have been warming somewhat. Jakarta only recently agreed "in principle" to accept a Soviet offer of over \$100 million in credit to finance and build two hydroelectric projects in Java. This is the first Soviet aid to Indonesia since the abortive coup by the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965.

Broader issues are also involved. In Moscow's eyes, instability in Southeast Asia--even in Portuguese Timor--evokes the specter of increased Chinese and American influence. The Soviets believe, however ideologically distasteful it may be, that the Indonesian government is the best hope of restoring order to the troubled island of Timor. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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December 16, 1975

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Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko  
to Japan in January

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko will go to Japan early next month. No precise date has yet been set, according to Japanese Foreign Ministry officials.

Gromyko's trip to Japan has been in the works for many months. It ran afoul of Tokyo's efforts to negotiate a peace treaty with China in which the latter pressed for the infamous hegemony clause. With that treaty still unsigned, Gromyko may have felt a visit was necessary.

His talks with the Japanese will be difficult. The northern territories issue is certain to be brought up, and Gromyko will not have anything new to offer. Moscow has hinted that it might consider giving back two of the islands, but no more. Gromyko will also be bearded by the Japanese on the meaning of a reference in his article in the October issue of *Kommunist* implying that the territorial issue was settled. The Japanese say that this violates the Brezhnev-Tanaka understanding that the northern territories were an appropriate subject of negotiations between the two countries. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Prague's Press Blasted by Belgrade

With the ink hardly dry on the joint communique summing up Premier Strougal's visit to Belgrade, the Czechoslovak press last week once again incurred the wrath of the Yugoslavs because of its subservience to Moscow.

On Wednesday, the Czechoslovak party daily *Rude Pravo* commemorated the 1960 and 1969 Moscow conferences of communist parties by calling for a new world party conclave. The commentary gave a passing nod to the independence of the parties, but its emphasis was on "proletarian internationalism" and on Moscow's "international recognition as the vanguard of the movement." On the deadlocked preparations for the European party conference, *Rude Pravo* came down hard in favor of a "truly militant and Communist" final document. It also pushed the struggle against Maoism, which it said has now become "an urgent combat task for the entire Communist movement."

Belgrade's predictably angry response came quickly. The Yugoslavs rejected Prague's attempt to require all parties to join in the anti-Chinese polemics and took particular exception to its claim that the documents signed at the 1960 and 1969 conferences --which Yugoslavia did not attend--are still valid. The party organ *Borba* pointed out with some asperity that Belgrade considers Prague's statements on these documents as direct interference in Yugoslav internal affairs.

During the Strougal visit, the Yugoslavs probably presented the Czechs a list of their grievances over the content of Prague's propaganda. Such barbs may continue to delay the visit of President Tito, which the Czechoslovak regime desires. Yugoslav handling of their complaint--broadcasting it to the Soviet Union in Russian--indicates that they also intended the message to get to Prague's mentors.  
(CONFIDENTIAL)

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Hungary-Romania: Public Warmth

The Hungarian regime tried hard to create a warm atmosphere for Romanian Foreign Minister Macovescu's visit to Budapest from December 8-11. The differing viewpoints of the two sides were nonetheless evident.

In addition to his formal talks with his Hungarian counterpart, Frigyes Puja, Macovescu made official calls on President Losonczi, Premier Lazar, and Politburo member Biszku, who apparently was standing in for the traveling Kadar. The embassy says that Hungarian media provided unusually friendly publicity, with several editorials calling for closer economic and political ties with Bucharest.

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[REDACTED] this public display of warmth is a result of a decision by both sides that differences over the Hungarian minority in Romania should not interfere with improving economic ties or with efforts to understand the other's position on certain European political issues.

The communique, however, stated that the two foreign ministers had a "frank and open exchange of views" on bilateral relations, thus suggesting that differences over the minority issue were freely aired. The two sides also "exchanged views" on international issues, the communique stated, but the Hungarians did get the maverick Romanians to accept favorable mention of the Warsaw Pact, CEMA, and "socialist internationalism." (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Aleksandur Lilov, Politburo member and party secretary for ideology, has returned to public view after an absence of nearly five months.

According to a Bulgarian newspaper, Lilov was present on December 11 when party/state leader Zhivkov addressed a Sofia meeting of the Bulgarian Writers Union. Lilov had been absent from the usual gatherings of the Bulgarian leadership since July 23 and has also missed numerous ideological sessions at which he would normally officiate.

Lilov is apparently not in political trouble. Young and highly regarded, he has been a primary architect of the "ideological offensive" that is Bulgaria's response to detente with the West. This hard-line policy continues, and the press on several occasions over the last few months has mentioned Lilov favorably. He is a close friend of Zhivkov's daughter, Lyudmila, and some rumors claim that he may be her third husband.

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Lilov is very seriously ill and was in the Soviet Union receiving medical treatment. We have no information about the nature of his infirmity or how it will affect his future within the leadership. (SECRET)

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